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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 04-2067

LINAWATI BONG;
ANDREAS KOSIM;
SYLVIA PRECIOUS VENLIANTY,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1
Respondent.

On petition for review of a final order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
File Nos: A95-161-372, A95-161-373, A95-161-374

Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 21, 2005
Before: ROTH, FUENTES,
and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 27, 2005 )
______________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________
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Caption amended pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 43(c).
1

Fuentes, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Linawati Bong2 appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because the
BIA’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.
I.
As we write only for the parties, we recite only the essential facts. Bong alleges
that she is Christian and of Chinese descent, and that these groups are persecuted in
Indonesia. Bong bases her asylum claim on two incidents. First, in May 1998, a group
of about four persons broke into her home by force, shouted ethnic slurs at Bong and her
husband, and then beat them and robbed them. After she regained consciousness,
Bong’s husband called various relatives and then arranged for a taxi to take them to a
hospital. A policeman came to the hospital to interview them. Second, in October 2000,
Bong allegedly was robbed again, in her car, while stuck in a traffic jam on the way back
from church. Half of the members of her church were allegedly attacked. Bong claims
that her assailants identified her as Christian based on a Bible visible in the backseat of
her car. Bong further alleges that she and her husband had the car windows repaired but
that the car was later stolen.
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Bong is the lead petitioner. The claims of her husband and child are derivative.
2

Bong left Indonesia in January 2001. Although she lawfully entered the United
States, she remained in the country longer than she was authorized to stay, and the
Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) commenced removal proceedings against
her in December 2001. Bong conceded removability under Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), but filed the instant claims
for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under CAT. The IJ rejected Bong’s
claims in September 2002 and the BIA affirmed in March 2004.
II.
We review the BIA and IJ’s decisions under the substantial evidence standard. See
Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). We conclude that the IJ’s decision,

and the BIA’s affirmance of it, were supported by a number of factors which together
amply support their conclusions.
Although the IJ never explicitly found Bong’s testimony incredible, she implied as
much. First, with respect to the 1998 robbery, the IJ questioned how the individuals who
attacked and robbed Bong in her home knew that she was Chinese since there is no
evidence that she lived in a Christian area. Second, with respect to the 2000 robbery, the
IJ noted that Bong is not consistent about either the date or the number of attackers
involved in the 2000 incident. The IJ also questioned why half of Bong’s church
congregation would be stuck together in a traffic jam five to ten minutes away from their
church. More generally, the IJ doubted that the Indonesian police were “vicious” toward
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Christians and Chinese and tolerated the attacks against them since Bong sought their
assistance after both incidents and the police responded both times. Finally, the IJ
observed that Bong intentionally did not attempt to collect any corroborating evidence
(e.g., hospital reports, police reports, affidavits from family or church members, or
evidence that Bong ever owned a car), even though Bong presumably had access to such
documents since she remains in frequent contact with people in Indonesia. See Abdulai
v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “the BIA may sometimes
require [applicants] to supply corroborating evidence in order to meet their burden of
proof”). In light of these findings, the IJ held that, even to the extent events took place as

Bong narrated them, Bong was probably robbed for her possessions and not targeted for
her group membership. The IJ’s refusal to fully credit Bong’s factual allegations was
reasonable and must be upheld. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242
F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).

Bong and her family continued living in their home after the 1998 robbery, until
2001. Their Christian, ethnically Chinese family members continue to live in Indonesia
without problems. Noting that circumstances have changed since the 1998 anti-Chinese
riots, both the IJ and the BIA reasonably determined that, though there is ongoing
conflict between Muslims and Christians in certain regions, the government of Indonesia
is neither unwilling nor unable to control it. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
Bong has not shown that Christians or Chinese are subject to persecution in
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Indonesia such that she faces a reasonable possibility of harm upon her return. But even
if Bong’s fears were justified, the IJ reasonably could have rejected Bong’s claims on the
grounds that Bong refuses to consider relocating within Indonesia, e.g. to an area with a
concentrated Christian population. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (2)(ii).
Bong’s CAT claim would fail for reasons similar to those discussed above, but as
she fails even to argue that claim on appeal, she has effectively waived it. See
Wisniewski v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 88 (3d Cir.1987) (“An issue that is
not addressed in an appellant's brief is deemed waived on appeal.”).
For all the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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